The New York Times reveals more US intelligence secrets: Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran’s Nuclear Aims. (Hat tip: LGF readers.)

In mid-July, senior American intelligence officials called the leaders of the international atomic inspection agency to the top of a skyscraper overlooking the Danube in Vienna and unveiled the contents of what they said was a stolen Iranian laptop computer.

The Americans flashed on a screen and spread over a conference table selections from more than a thousand pages of Iranian computer simulations and accounts of experiments, saying they showed a long effort to design a nuclear warhead, according to a half-dozen European and American participants in the meeting.

The documents, the Americans acknowledged from the start, do not prove that Iran has an atomic bomb. They presented them as the strongest evidence yet that, despite Iran’s insistence that its nuclear program is peaceful, the country is trying to develop a compact warhead to fit atop its Shahab missile, which can reach Israel and other countries in the Middle East.

The briefing for officials of the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency, including its director Mohamed ElBaradei, was a secret part […not any more… —ed.] of an American campaign to increase international pressure on Iran. But while the intelligence has sold well among countries like Britain, France and Germany, which reviewed the documents as long as a year ago, it has been a tougher sell with countries outside the inner circle.

The computer contained studies for crucial features of a nuclear warhead, said European and American officials who had examined the material, including a telltale sphere of detonators to trigger an atomic explosion. The documents specified a blast roughly 2,000 feet above a target - considered a prime altitude for a nuclear detonation.

Nonetheless, doubts about the intelligence persist among some foreign analysts. In part, that is because American officials, citing the need to protect their source, have largely refused to provide details of the origins of the laptop computer beyond saying that they obtained it in mid-2004 from a longtime contact in Iran. Moreover, this chapter in the confrontation with Iran is infused with the memory of the faulty intelligence on Iraq’s unconventional arms. In this atmosphere, though few countries are willing to believe Iran’s denials about nuclear arms, few are willing to accept the United States’ weapons intelligence without question.

“I can fabricate that data,” a senior European diplomat said of the documents. “It looks beautiful, but is open to doubt.”

Robert G. Joseph, the under secretary of state for arms control and international security, who led the July briefing, declined to discuss any classified material from the session but acknowledged the existence of the warhead intelligence. He called it one of many indicators “that together lead to the conclusion Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.”

Only a fool could possibly doubt that Iran is working toward nuclear weapons, of course, but that’s a viewpoint you simply won’t find in mainstream media—who seem determined to treat Iran as if it were run by rational actors who never intend to mislead the West.

Oh, but don’t worry; these same fools also say we have at least 5 years before Iran can destroy Manhattan:

Even if the documents accurately reflect Iran’s advances in designing a nuclear warhead, Western arms experts say that Iran is still far away from producing the radioactive bomb fuel that would form the warhead’s heart. American intelligence agencies recently estimated that Iran would have a working nuclear weapon no sooner than the early years of the next decade.

They’ve been wrong about every single one of their predictions about nuclear programs; wrong about Iraq, wrong about Libya, wrong about Pakistan, wrong about India. But that never stops them from issuing these comforting assessments.