What Israelis Hear When Obama Officials Talk About Iran
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Over the weekend I had the privilege of sitting in on the 8th annual Saban Forum, a high-level, Brookings-sponsored dialogue between Israeli and American officials (current and former) along with journalists, intellectuals, and representatives from other countries in the Middle East. The participants discussed many significant topics, including the Arab Spring and its aftermath, the prospects for renewed peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and the state of the relationship between the United States and Israel.
By far the gravest issue, though, was how to proceed in the face of a looming Iranian nuclear threat. I came away from the two days with a dark and disturbing conclusion: There is a gulf between Israel and the United States that could have momentous consequences in 2012. When American officials declare that all options are on the table, most Israelis do not believe them. They have concluded, rather, that when the crunch comes (and everyone thinks it will), the United States will shy away from military force and reconfigure its policy to live with a nuclear-armed Iran. This is an outcome that no Israeli government can tolerate. For Israel, the Palestinian issue is an identity question: What kind of country will Israel be and what kind of life will Israelis lead? But the Iranian issue is an existential question: Will Israel and Israelis survive?
Most of the Forum was conducted under “Chatham House rules,” which prohibit naming or identifying participants. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s opening address was on the record, however. Much of the press coverage has focused on peace talks and on Panetta’s characteristically salty advice: “Just get to the damn table.” But from the Israeli perspective, the real news lay elsewhere.
In his opening remarks, the Secretary of Defense restated President Obama’s declared position on Iran’s nuclear ambitions that “we have not taken any option off the table.” During the question period, however, he offered a long list of reservations against the military option: Some of the targets are very difficult to get at, and even a successful attack would set back the Iranian program by no more than two years. The Iranian regime, now approaching pariah status, would be able to mobilize renewed support at home and abroad. U.S. interests in the Middle East would be subject to retaliation. The fragile economies of the United States and Europe would be gravely disrupted. And worst of all, the ensuing conflagration could “consume the Middle East in a confrontation and a conflict that we would regret.”