Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity
OVER THE PAST three decades, scholars of the Middle East have learned to avoid the very real pitfall of depicting Muslims as enigmatic Oriental “Others.” But it is impossible to escape the fact that most Occidentals will find both the subject and the setting of Laurent Bonnefoy’s new book unfamiliar and confounding. Indeed, Salafism in Yemen, which was researched and for the most part written before the Arab Spring, aptly deals with topics that are incredibly relevant for understanding a region in transition.
Salafism in particular has become increasingly important to grapple with in the wake of the Arab uprisings. Like other forms of Islamism, it is a revival movement that calls for the return to a purified Islam. Unlike other Islamists, however, Salafis completely reject modern political systems and ideas. Most non-Salafi Islamists, despite their use of Islamic idiom, infuse political ideas that originated in Europe into their ideologies. Thus Iran is an Islamic “Republic”; the Muslim Brotherhood speaks the language of “democracy” and “human rights”; Hamas and Hezbollah rail against “imperialism.” Salafis, on the other hand, insist that their creed is based solely on the Koran and the example of the Prophet Muhammad. Since none of those concepts and terms is found in the Islamic (or Christian or Jewish) canon, Salafis discard them. They argue, quite unabashedly, that a republic is by its nature anti-Islamic; that women and religious minorities are not equal to Muslim men; that democracy is a Western heresy, and so forth. For those accustomed to the intellectual contortions of the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi arguments can be oddly refreshing. There is no need to decipher their rhetoric or peel back the political spin. They say what they think, and unapologetically.
Historically, these views have typically pushed Salafis in two directions. A minority has joined various jihadi organizations such as Al Qaeda, which hope to eradicate all modern political systems and those that participate in them. But the vast majority of Salafis have tended simply to withdraw from politics. They oppose voting and democracy on principle. And though they often consider their states and political leaders illegitimate, they also embrace quietism and have been wary of the chaos and anarchy that rebellion might bring.
More recently, however, the Arab Spring and the freely contested elections that accompanied it have severely challenged this quietism. For many Salafis, the prospect of fair elections raised several practical issues for the first time. If a Salafi managed to gain real power, even if it was through illegitimate elections in an illegitimate state, couldn’t he do some good? Wouldn’t it be better to at least prevent the secularists and infidels from taking control? In the end, the lure of power proved too great, and Salafis, like their fellow citizens, flocked to the polls. Indeed, Salafi electoral successes have been one of the biggest surprises of recent elections. In Egypt, they won 27 percent of the vote. For Western observers and Arab secularists, this has increased both interest in Salafism and anxiety about the future of Arab politics