The Myth of German Hegemony
In 2010 and 2011, the first two years of Europe‚Äôs sovereign debt crisis, Germany seemed to emerge as the continent‚Äôs dominant power, possessing an unrivaled ability to shape its neighbors‚Äô destinies. Enjoying unabated economic strength, Germany agreed to bear the largest burden in the eurozone‚Äôs financial rescue, and so it was able to determine the pace and methods of managing the crisis. It also influenced the economic and budgetary policies of Europe‚Äôs debt-ridden countries, such as Greece and Spain, and it used that authority to impose an agenda of reform and austerity across the eurozone. Witnessing these developments, some observers went so far as to proclaim the onset of German hegemony and argued that only Berlin could solve the continent‚Äôs woes.
Although Germany is, to be sure, the most important European country for overcoming today‚Äôs problems, its abilities to project its power at the EU level are substantially restricted ‚ÄĒ and they will diminish further in the months ahead. Germany‚Äôs position as the chief backer of the eurozone‚Äôs stabilization arrangements does not necessarily translate into political supremacy. And as the euro crisis has escalated and Germany has lost political allies, it will now have to accept that the common currency area will only partly conform to its vision.
The first reason Berlin will struggle to implement its plans for Europe is that political developments of the last six months have left Germany a rather isolated giant. In 2010-11, it was largely because of cooperation between Berlin and Paris ‚ÄĒ and the close partnership between their two leaders that came to be known as Merkozy ‚ÄĒ that Germany was able to set European policy and disregard the attitudes of other eurozone members, generally the southern countries with large deficits. Now, France‚Äôs new president, Fran√ßois Hollande, has advocated a European pro-growth agenda that clashes with German Chancellor Angela Merkel‚Äôs preference for austerity and, in the view of many Germans, would not encourage national governments to implement necessary reforms. Meanwhile, Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands ‚ÄĒ smaller eurozone members that traditionally side with Germany on economic matters ‚ÄĒ have ceased to be reliable partners for Berlin, as populist forces have pressured their governments to withdraw from rescue mechanisms or demand stricter regulation of the recipient countries‚Äô budgets in exchange for financial help. Berlin‚Äôs other usual allies in balancing against Mediterranean-style policy approaches, the United Kingdom and Poland, lack importance in the present crisis. Neither country uses the euro, and the eurozone is where the main political decisions on the future of Europe will be made.¬†