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TO: All Members of the House of Representatives
FROM: HPSCf Minority
DATE: January 29, 2018
RE: Correcting the Record - The Russia Investigations
The /-IPSCI Majority’s move to release to the I-louse of Representatives its allegations against the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) is a transparent effort
to undermine those agencies, the Special Counsel, and Congress’ investigations. It also risks
public exposure of sensitive sources and methods for no legitimate purpose.
fBI and DOJ officials did not “abuse” the foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (fISA) process,
omit material information, or subvert this vital tool to spy on the Trump campaign.
In fact, DOJ and the FBI would have been remiss in their duty to protect the country had they not
sought a FISA warrant and repeated renewals to conduct temporary survcillance of Carter Page,
someone the FBI assessed to be an agent of the Russian government. DOJ met the rigor,
transparency, and evidentiary basis needed to meet FISA’s probable cause requirement, by
demonstrating:
o contemporaneous evidence of Russia’s election interference;
o concerning Russian links and outreach to Trump campaign officials;
o Page ‘s history with Russian intelligence; and
o Page’s suspicious activities in 2016, including in Moscow.
The Committee’s Minority has therefore prepared this memorandum to correct the record:
• Christopher Steele’s raw intelligence reporting did not inform the FBI’s decision to
initiate its counterintelligence investigation in late July 2016. In fact, the FBI’s closelyheld
investigative team only received Steele’s reporting in mid-September - more than seven
weeks later. The FBI - and, subsequently, the Special Counsel’s - investigation into links
between the Russian government and Trump campaign associates has been based on
troubling law enforcement and intelligence information unrelate• DOJ’s October 21, 2016 FlSA application and three subsequent renewnls corefully
outlincd for the Court a multi-pronged rotionale for surveilling Poge, who, at the time of
the first application, was no longer with the Trump campaign. DOJ detailed Page’s past
relationships with Russian spies and interaction with Russian officials during the 2016
campaign, DOJ cited multiple sources to support the case for
surveilling Page - but made only narrow use of information from Steele’s sources about
Page’s specific activities in 2016, chiefly his suspected July 2016 meetings in Moscow with
Russian ollicials. In fact,
the FBI interviewed Page in March 2016 about his contact Ig~”C~, the very
month candidate Donald Trump named him a foreign policy advisor.
As DOJ informed the Court in subsequent renewals,
Steele’s reporting about Page’s Moscow meetings s
applications did!!Q! otherwise rely on Steele’s reporting, including any “salacious” allegations
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about Trump, and the FBI never paid Steele for this reporting. While explaining why the FBI
viewed Steele’s reporting and sources as reliable and credible, 001 also disclosed:
o Steele’s prior relationship with the FBI;
o the fact of and reason for his termination as a source; and
o the assessed political motivation of those who hired him.
• The Committee Majority’s memorandum, which draws selectively on highly sensitive
classified information, includes other distortions and misrepresentations that are
contradicted by the underlying classified documents, which the vast m~ority of Members of
the Committee and the House have not had the opportunity to review - and which Chairman
Nunes chose not to read himself. I
Background
On January 18, 2018, the Committee Majority, during an unrelated business meeting, forced a
surprise vote to release to the full House a profoundly misleading memorandum alleging serious
abuses by the FBI and 001. Majority staff drafted the document in secret on behalf of Chairman
Devin Nunes (and reportedly with guidance and input from Rep. Trey Gowdy), and then rushed
a party-line vote without prior notice.
This was by design. The overwhelming majority of Committee Members never received DOJ
authorization to access the underlying classified information, and therefore could not judge the
veracity of Chairman Nunes’ claims. Due to sensitive sources and methods, DOJ provided access
only to the Committee’s Chair and Ranking Member (or respective designees), and limited staff,
to facilitate thc Committee’s investigation into Russia’s covert campaign to influence the 2016
u.S. elections.2 As DOJ has confirmed publicly, it did not authorize the bronder release of this
information within Congress or to the public, and Chairman Nunes refused to allow DOJ and the
FBI to review his document until he permitted the FBI Director to see it for the first time in
HPSCI’s secure spaces late on Sunday, lanuary 28 - 10 days after disclosure to the House. J
FBI’s Counterintelligence Investigation
In its October 20 I G FlSA application and subsequent renewals, DOJ accurately informed the
Court that the FBI initiated its counterintelligence investigation on July 31, 2016, after receiving
information George Papadopoulos revealed
that individuals linked to Russin, who took interest in Papadopoulos
adviser, informed him in late A 2016 that Russia
moreover, occurred against the backdrop of Russia’s aggressive covert campaign to influence
our elections, which the FBI was already monitoring. We would latcr learn in Papadopoulos’s
plea that that the information the Russians could assist by anonymously releasing were thousands
of Hillary Clinton ‘s emails.’
DOJ told the Court the truth. Its representation was consistent with the FBI’s underlying
investigative record, wh ich current and former senior officials later corroborated in extensive
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Committee testimony. Christopher Steele’s reporting, which he began to share with an FBI agent
_ through the end of October 20 16, played no role in launching the
FBI’s into Russian interference and links to the Trump
campaign. In fact, Steele ‘s reporting did not reach the counterintelligence team investigating
Russia at FBI headquarters until mid-September 20 I 6, more than seven weeks after the FBI
opened its investigation, because the probe’s existence was so closely held within the FBI.6 By
then, the FBI had sub-i into individuals linked to the T.,,~n
As Committee testimony bears out, the FBI would have continued its investigation, including
against_ individuals, even ifit had never received information from Steele, never applied
for a FISA warrant against Page, or if the FISC had rejected the application. 7
DOJ’s FISA Application and Renewals
The initial warrant application and sllbsequ~.£t renewals received independent scrutiny and
approval by four different federal judges, thr-ee of whom were appointed by President George W. 0’1 ( “‘1
Bush and one by President Ronald Reagan. DOJ tirst applied to the FISC on October 21 , 2016 ~ Ulv~
for a warrant to permit the FBI to initiate electronic surveillance and physical search of Page for H.W 6 ,,- 1
90 days, consistent with FISA requirements. The Court approved three renewals - in early
January 2017, early April 2017, and late June 2017 - which authorized the FBI to maintain
surveillance on Page until late September 2017. Senior DOJ and FBI officials appointed by the
Obama and Trump Administrations, including acting Attorney General Dana Boente and Deputy
Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, certified the applications with the Court.
FISA was!!.!!! used to spy on Trump or his campaign. As the Trump campaign and Page have
acknowledged, Page ended his formal affiliation with (he campaign months before DOJ applied
for a warrant. DOJ, moreover, submiued the initial application less than three weeks before the
election, even though the FBI’s investigation had been ongoing since the end of July 2016.
DOJ ‘s warrant request was based on compelling evidence and probable cause to believe Page was
knowingly assisting clandestine Russian intelligence activities in the U.S.:
•
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Page remained on the radar of Russian intelligence and the FBI. In 2013, prosecutors
indicted three other Russian spies, two of whom targeted Page for recruitment. The FBI also
interviewed Page multiple times about his Russian intelligence contacts, including in March
2016. 10 The FBI’s concern about and knowledge of Page’s activities therefore long predate
the FBI’s receipt of Steele’s information.
• Page’s Suspicious Activity During the 2016 Campaign: The FISA applications also ‘1
sus;pi(~iol.ls WOll'ltV after the Trump campaign in March 2016.
Page traveled to Moscow in July
iversiltv commencement address - an honor usually reserved for wello
It is in this specific sub-section of the applications that DOJ refers to Steele’s
reporting on Page and his alleged coordination with Russian officials. Steele’s
information about Page was consistent with the FBI’s assessment of Russian
intelligence efforts to recruit him and his connections to Russian persons of interest.
o In particular, Steele’s sources reported that Page met separately while in Russia with
Igor Sechin, a close associate of Vladimir Putin and executive chairman of Rosnell,
Russia’s state-owned oil company, and Igor Divyekin, a senior Kremlin official. Sechin
allegedly discussed the prospect of future U.S.-Russia energy cooperation and “an
associated move to lift Ukraine-related western sanctions against Russia.” Divyekin
allegedly disclosed to Page that the Kremlin possessed compromising information on
Clinton (“kompromat”) and noted “the possibility of its being released to Candidate
III ‘5 campaign.” II [Note: “Candidate #1” refers to candidate Trump.] This closely
tracks what other Russian contacts were informing another Trump foreign policy
advisor. George Papadopoulos.
• In subsequent FISA renewals, DOJ provided additional information obtained tbrough
multiple independent sources that corroborated Steele’s reporting.
o
o
o Page’s
This infonnation contradicts Page’ 5 November 2. 2017 testimony to the Committee, in which
he initially denied any such meetings and then was forced to admit speaking with
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Dvorkovich and meeting with Rosneft’s Sechin-tied investor relations chief, Andrey
Baranov.
• The Court-approved surveillance of Page allowed FBI to collect valuable intelligence.
The FISA renewals demonstrate that the FBI collected important investigative information
and leads by conducting surveillance. For instance,
Page’s efforts
sworn testimony to our Comrnittee
DOJ’s Transparency about Christopher Steele
Far from “omitting” material facts about Steele, as the Majority claims,17 DOJ repeatedly
informed the Court about Steele’s background, credibility, and potential bias. DOJ
explained in detail Steele’s prior relationship with and compensation from the FBI; his
credibility, reporting history, and source network; the fact of and reason for his termination as a
source in late October 2016; and the likely political motivations of those who hired Steele.
• DOJ was transparent with Court about Steele’s sourcing: The Committee Majority,
which had earlier accused Obama Administration otlicials of improper “unmasking,” faults
DOJ for not revealing the names of specific U.S. persons and entities in the FISA application
and subsequent renewals. In fact, DOJ appropriately upheld its longstanding practice of
protecting U.S. citizen information by purposefully not “unmasking” U.S. person and entity
names, unless they were themselves the subject of a cOllnterintelligence investigation. DOJ
instead used generic identifiers that provided the Court with more than sufficient information
to understand the political context of Steele’s research. In an extensive explanation to the
Court, DOJ discloses that Steele
“was approached by an idefllified US. Person, JH who indicated to SOl/rce #1 {Steele!,” Ihat a
US.-based law.lirm 211 had hired the ideflli{ied US. Person /0 conduct resea”clt regarding
Candidate #1 ‘S11 lies to Russia. (The identified Us. Person and Source #1 have a longstanding
business relationship.) The identified u.s. person hired Source #Ito conduct this
research. The identified Us. {‘erson never advised SOl/rce #1 as to tire motivation behind the
research into Candida/I! #1 ‘s lies 10 Russia. The FBI j’Qecu/ale.s that (he identified u.s. Person
was likelv looking for informalion thaI could be used to discredil Candidate #1 ‘s campaign . .. 12
Contrary to the Majority’s assertion that DOJ fails to mention that Steele’s research was
commissioned by “political actors” to “obtain derogatory information on Donald Trump’s
ties to Russia,”23 DOJ in fact informed the Court accurately that Steele was hired by
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politically-motivated U.S. persons and entities and that his research appeared intended
for use “to discredit” Trump’s campaign.
• DOJ explained the FBI’s reasonable basis for nnOlnl2
descri bed Steele as
report on . and other matters, including information DOJ used in
criminal proceedings. 24 Senior FBI and DOJ ollicials have repeatedly aflirmed to the
Committee the reliability and credibility of Steele’s reporting, an assessment also reflected in
the FBJ’s underlying source documents.25 The FBI has undertaken a rigorous process to vet
allegations from Steele’s reporting, including with regard to Page. 26
• The FBI properly notified the FISC after it terminated Steele as a source for making
unauthorized disclosures to the media. The Majority cites no evidence that the FBI, prior
to filing its initial October 21,2016 application, actually knew or should have known of any
allegedly inappropriate media contacts by Steele. Nor do they cite evidence that Steele
disclosed to Yahoo! details included in the FISA warrant, since the British Court filings to
which they refer do not address what Steele may have said to Yahoo!.
DOJ informed the Court in its renewals that the FBI acted promptly to terminate Steele atlcr
learning Irom him (atler DOl tiled the first warrant application) that he had discussed his
work with a media outlet in late Octobe,·. The January 2018 renewal further explained to the
Court that Steele told the FBI that he made his unauthorized media disclosure because of his
frustration at Director Corney’s public announcement shortly belore the election that the FBI
reopened its investigation into candidate Clinton’s email use.
• DOJ never paid Steele for the “dossier”: The Majority asserts that the FBI had “separately
authorized payment” to Steele for his research on Trump but neglects to mention that
payment was cancelled and never made. As the FBI’s records and Committee testilllorlY
the FBI initially considered compensation
Steele ultimately n(‘ver payment
any “dossicr”-reilltcd 27 DOl accurately informed the Court that Steele had
becn an FBI confidential human source since., for which he was “compensated
by the FBI” - payment for previously-shared information of value
“U’iSl~ investigation.28
Additional Omissions, Errors, lind Distortions in the Majority’s MemorandulII
• DOJ appropriately provided the Court with a comprehensive explanation of Russia’s
election interference, including evidence that Russia courted another Trump campaign
advisor, Papadopoulos, and that Russian agents previewed their hack and
dissemination of stolen emails. In claiming that there is “110 evidence of any cooperation or
conspiracy between Page and Papadopoulos,”29 the Majority misstates the reason why DOl
specifically explained Russia’s courting of Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos’s interaction with
Russian agents, coupled with real-time evidence of Russian election interference, provided
the Court with a broader context in which to evaluate Russia’s clandestine activities and
Page’s history and alleged contact with Russian officials. Moreover, since only Page_
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__, no evidence of a separate conspiracy between him and
~. DOJ would have been negligent in omitting vital information
about Papadopoulos and Russia’s concerted efforts.
• In its Court filings, DOJ made proper use of news coverage. The Majority falsely claims
that the FISA materials “relied heavily” on a September 23,2016 Yahoo! News article by
Michaellsikoff and that this article “does not corroborate the Steele Dossier because it is
derived from information leaked by Steele himself.” 30 In fact, DO] referenced Isikoff’s
article, alongside another article the Majority fails to mention, not to provide separate
corroboration lor Steele’s reporting, but instead to inform the Court of Page’s public denial
of his suspected meetin which also echoed in a bel’ 2016 letter
to FBI Director Com
• The Majority’s reference to Bruce Ohr is misleading. The Majority mischaracterizes
Bruce Ohr’s role, overstates the significance of his interactions with Steele, and misleads
about the timeframe of Ohr’s communication with the FBI. In late November 2016, Ohr
informed the FBI of his prior professional relationship with Steele and information that
Steele shared with him (including Steele’s concern about Trump being compromised by
Russia). He also described his wife’s contract work “”ith Fusion GPS, the firm that hired
Steele separately. This occurred weeks after the election and more than a month after the
Court approved the initial FISA application. The Majority describes Bruce Ohr as a senior
DO] official who “worked closely with the Deputy Attorney General, Yates and later
Rosenstein,” in order to imply that Ohr was somehow involved in the FISA process, but there
is no indication this is the case.
Bruce Ohr is a well-respected career professional whose portfolio is drugs and organized
crime, not counterintelligence. There is no evidence that he would have known about the
Page f[SA applications and their contents. The Majority’s assertions, moreover, are
irrelevant in determining the veracity of Steele’s reporting. By the time Ohr debriefs with the
FBI, it had already terminated Steele as a source and was independently corroborating
Steele’s reporting about Page’s activities. Bruce Ohr took the initiative to inform the FBI of
what he knew, and the Majority does him a grave disservice by suggesting he is part of some
malign conspiracy.
• Finally, Peter Strzok and Lisa Page’s text messages are irrelevant to the FISA
application. The Majority gratuitously includes reference to Strzok and Page at the end of
their memorandum , in an effort to imply that political bias infected the FBI’s investigation
and DOl’s FISA applications. In fact, neither Strzok nor Page served as affiants on the
applications, which were the product of extensive and senior DOJ and FBI review. 32 In
demonizing both career professionals, the Majority accuses them of “orchestrating leaks to
the media” - a serious charge; omits inconvenient text messages, in which they critiqued a
wide range or other officials and candidates from both parties; does not disclose that FBI
Deputy Director McCabe testified to the Committee that he had no idea what Page and
Strzok were referring to in their “insurance policy” texts;33 and ignores Strzok’s
acknowledged role in preparing a public declaration, by then Director Corney, about former
Secretary Clinton’s “extreme carelessness” in handling classified information-which greatly
damaged Clinton ‘s public reputation in the days just prior to the presidential election.
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I Letter to HPSCI Chairman Devin Nunes, Assistant Attorney General Stephen Boyd, Deportment of Justice,
January 24, 2018.
, Letter to HPSCI Chairman Devin Nunes, Assistant Attorney General Stephen Boyd, Department of Justice,
January 24, 2018, 001 also confirmed in writing to Minority StaffDOJ and PBI’s terms of review:
the Department has accommodated HPSCI’s oversight request by allowing repented in camera reviews of
the material in an appropriate secure facility under the general stipulations that (I) the Chair (or his
delegAte) Rnd the RAnking Member (or his delegate) and two starr etch, with appropriate security
dearances, be allowed 10 review on behRlf of the Committee, (2) lhatthe review lake place in a reading
room set up at the Department, and (3) that the documents 110t leave the physical conll’Ol of the Department,
and (5) thot the review opportunities be bipartisan in nature. Though we originally requested that no notes
be taken, in acknowledgment ora request by the Committee and recognizing that the volume of documents
had increased with time, the Department eventually allowed notes to be taken to facilitate HPSCl’s review.
Also, initial reviews oflhe material include [sicJ short brietings hy Department officials to put the material
in context and to provide some additional information.
Email from Stephen Boyd to HPSCI Minority Stoff, January 18,2018 (cmphasis supplied).
3 Letter to HPSCl Chairman Devin Nunes, Assistant Attorney General Stephen Boyd, Department of Justice,
January 24. 20t8.
, Papadopoulos’s October 5, 2017 guilty plea adds further texture to this inilialtip, by clarifying that a Russian agent
told Papadopoulos that “They [the Russiansl have dirt on her”; “the Russians had emails of Clinton”; “they have
thousands of cmails.” u.s. v. George Papadopoillos (I: 17-cr- 182, District of Columbia), p. 7.
7 Under the Special Counsel’s direction, Flynn and Papadopoulos have both pleaded gUilty to lying to federal
investigators and are cooperating with the Special Counsel ‘s investigation. while Manafort and his long-time aide,
former Trump deputy campaign manager Rick Gates. have been indicted on muhiple counts and are awaiting trial.
See u.s. v. Michael T. Flynn (I : 17-cr-232, District of Columbia); U.S. v. Paul J. ManaJorl. Jr., and Richard W.
Gales 11/ (I: 17-cr-20 I, District of Columbia); u.s. v. George Papadopoulos (I: 17·cr-182, District of Columbia).
I I Department of Justice. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, October 21, 2016, p.18. Repented in
subsequent renewal applications
12 Department of Justice, Foreign lntclligencc Surveillance Court Application, June 29, 2017, pp. 20-21.
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the FBI and broader Intelligence Community’s high
KUSSUIn government was engaged in a covert interference campaign to influence the
2016 election, including that Russian intelligence actors Hcompromised the DNCI1 and WikiLeaks subsequently
leaked in July 2016 “a trove” of DNC emails. Department of Justice, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
Application, October 21,2016. pp. 6-7. Repeated and updated with new information in subsequent renewal
applications. Department of Justice, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, June 29, 2017, pp. 20-21.
” Department of Justice, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, June 29, 2017, pp. 36, 46,48.
16 Department of Justice, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, June 29, 2017. p. 56.
17 HPSCI Majority Memorandum, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Abllses at the Department af Justice and
the Federal Bureau 0/ Investigation. Jalluary 18, 2018, pp. 2-3 (enumerating “omissions” of fact, regarding Steele
and his activities, from the Page FISA applications).
I II Glenn Simpson.
19 Christopher Steele.
20 Perkins Coie LLP.
21 Donald Trump.
” Department of Justice, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, October 21, 2016. pp. 15-16, n. 8.
Repented in subsequent renewal applications.
lJ HPSCI Majority Memorandum, Foreign Imelligence Surveillance Act Abuses althe Department 0/ Justice and
the Federal Bureau o/Invesllgalion. January 18, 2018, p. 2.
24 Department of Justice, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, October 21.2016, p. 15, footnote 8.
Repeated in subsequent renewal applications.
2S Interview of Andrew McCabe (FBI Deputy Director), House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
December 19, 2017, p. 46,100; Interview of Sally Yates (former Deputy Attorney General), House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, November 3. 2017, p. 16; Interview with John Carlin (former Assistant Attorney General
for National Security), House Permanent Seleci Committee on Intelligence. July, 2017. p. 35.
26 Interview of Andrew McCabe (FBI Deputy Dircctor) •. Housc Pennantnt Select Committee on Intelligence,
December 19,2017,p. 100-101,115.
n Interview ofFill Agent, House Permanent Sclect Committee on Intelligence, December 20,2017, p. 112.
” Department of Justice, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, October 21,2016. pp. 15-16, n. 8.
Repeated in subsequc:nt renewal applications.
29 HPSCI Majority Memorandum, Foreign Intelligence Surlleillance Act Ahllse~’ at the Department olJus tice and
the federal Bureau oj Investigation. January 18,2018, p. 4 (“The Page FISA application also mentions information
regarding fellow Trump campaign advisor George Papadopoulos, but there is no evidcnce of any cooperation or
conspiracy between Page and Papadopoulos.”)
)0 IiPSCI Majority Memorandum, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Abu.fes at the Department qf Justice and
the Federal Bllreau a/Investigation. January 18,2018. p. 2. Neither Isikoffnor Yahoo’ are specitically identified in
the FISA Materials, in keeping with the FBI’s general practice of not identifying U.S. persons.
11 Department of Justice, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, October 21,2016, p. 25; Department
of Justice, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, January 12. 2017, p. 31; Carter Page. Letter to FBI
Director James Corney. September 25, 20_16I. f 9 lillilllllfllIU~fi’R”
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JJ Interview of Andrew McCabe (FBI Deputy Director), House Pennanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
December 19,2017, p. 157.
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