What I hear from many liberals about Cruz’s chances are two things. One is just disbelief: Republicans wouldn’t really do something like nominate Cruz, would they? The key is that Ted Cruz isn’t Herman Cain or even Michele Bachmann; he’s a United States senator, and that counts for something (that is, conventional credentials count for something) in presidential elections. So, yes, they really could do something like that.
The other thing I hear, however, is perhaps even more wrong. Some liberals react by actively rooting for Cruz. The theory? The nuttier the nominee, the worse the chances of Republicans retaking the White House. Indeed, in conversation I’ve heard all sorts of justifications: Cruz couldn’t possibly win Florida! Therefore, he couldn’t win the White House!
Don’t listen to it.
Conclusion: Arizona, Rubio, or somewhere in between?
Basically, the choice the GOP has here can be summed up as whether it wants the Arizona model, what we might call the “Rubio model,” or something in between. Arizona has recently operated as something of a poster child for everything you could possibly do wrong as a Republican-governed state bordering Mexico. George W. Bush won the state by 10 points in 2004; hometown hero John McCain won by eight in 2008.
But Republican Gov. Jan Brewer, who spearheaded the state’s controversial immigration law, won by 12 points. Romney won by almost the same margin as McCain (it was a closer race nationally, but Romney didn’t have McCain’s “home team advantage”). The Hispanic vote grew, and dropped off substantially for Brewer and Romney, but it was compensated for by a surge in white support, particularly among non-college educated whites.
A similar effect is probably occurring in Texas. Even if Republicans aren’t losing ground among Hispanics (we don’t know, because we don’t have exits for 2012), the state should still be trending blue due to demographic change. But it isn’t. Romney won it by 16 points, McCain won by 12, Bush won by 23 and 21 points. When you account for changes in the national environment and Bush being a hometown governor, that actually works out to slight movement toward Republicans.
On the other hand, the GOP could go “full Rubio”: Back immigration reform, nominate a Hispanic-friendly candidate, and see what happens if Hispanic population growth slows. This approach works pretty well, even if Republicans sacrifice some progress with white voters:
I don’t mean to leave the impression that the GOP will win no matter what it does. Tweak some of these assumptions, and you get plenty of Democratic wins too. And it may not matter what the GOP chooses. The most dispiriting possibility is that racially diverse electorates may inherently add racial cleavages to otherwise “neutral” issues, and that polarization becomes inevitable. That’s certainly the experience of Northern cities during the great immigrant wave of the early 1900s, as well as of the American South.
My point is simply that there are a slew of realistic scenarios where Republicans do very well in the future. In most of the scenarios I consider reasonable, the elections stay close enough that either party could win most any individual election for the foreseeable future.
My overall view of presidential elections is that they are like giant algebra problems that suddenly simplify down to three or four variables at the end. Both sides have reasonably good arguments and appeals, run decent campaigns, nominate competent (if not outstanding) candidates and raise enough money to be heard. This end result is that this tends to cancel out.
Things like the economy, wars and incumbent fatigue create a fairly narrow playing field. The other factors, under normal circumstances, can probably move things three or four points in either direction. The fundamentals did a pretty good job predicting 2004, 2008, and 2012, without any regard to demographic shifts. I suspect this will continue in the future.
The GOP and Democrats should pursue the policies they believe are best for the country. If they govern competently, the coalitions will take care of themselves.
Clink the link and read all 3 articles.
From 2 complete readings and a cursory review of his calculations his analysis of the political future of elections in regards to the Hispanic vote seams reasonable. But this is only considering Hispanics. This same analysis that includes women and younger folks would drastically change the conclusions.
At first blush, about all I can see about Long’s little valentine is that it’s not quite as bad an idea - but it’s close - as the one some deep thinkers came up with to have states, including Indiana, secede from the union to protest President Obama’s re-election. We’ve been down that road before. It leads to a place called Antietam and what is still the bloodiest civil war in human history, a time when brothers, cousins and fellow countrymen killed each other by the hundreds of thousands.
Let’s not do that again.
If Long’s notion is not quite that extreme, it still, to use a phrase my grandfather used to love, “comes from a place where the trains don’t run.”
Several things could be noted about Long’s idea.
The most obvious is that even the moderate wing of the Republican Party now occupies territory to the right not just of Ronald Reagan, but also Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond.
The second is that Long’s proposal is a tacit admission on the part of Republicans that they’re not going to win the debate on health care at the ballot box or in the courts.
The GOP has lost the popular vote in five of the last six presidential elections. Republicans like to point the fact that they control the U.S. House of Representatives, but they actually lost the popular vote - 49 percent to 48 percent - in congressional races in the 2012 election. Gerrymandering allowed them to retain control of the chamber.
Conservatives pinned their hopes on the Supreme Court overturning health care reform, but that didn’t pan out. Perhaps because he didn’t want history to see him as John Marshall in reverse, Chief Justice John Roberts - a conservative appointed by George W. Bush - upheld the bulk of the health care changes.
But let’s set that aside for now, even though it is worth remembering should Long or other lawmakers who vote for this proposal pontificate about honoring either the will of the people or the rule of law.
Instead, let’s focus on the meat of Long’s concern, his displeasure with the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. It can be found in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 and it says that Congress shall have the power:
French wingnut kookspiracy nuts claim Obama hacked their election. The far right never accepts defeat graciously, do they?
French officials said that the attacks occurred between April 22, 2012, when the first round of the country’s most recent presidential elections was held, and May 6, 2012, when a runoff was held, which resulted in socialist Francois Hollande beating Sarkozy. The officials said the attackers had first conducted reconnaissance using Facebook, “friended” Sarkozy advisers, then sent them phishing emails that led to a fake version of the French government’s intranet, which was used to capture the targets’ intranet usernames and passwords.
U.S. officials rejected the allegations. “We categorically deny the allegations by unnamed sources that the U.S. government participated in a cyber attack against the French government,” said Department of Homeland Security spokesman Matthew Chandler via email. “France is one of our strongest allies. Our outstanding cooperation in intelligence sharing, law enforcement and cyber defense has never been stronger, and remains essential in successfully combating the common threat of extremism.”
[ As the Gaza military crisis escalates, so has the response from hackers. See Anonymous Steps Into Gaza Crisis. ]
How reliable are the Flame allegations reported in L’Express? Consider that when Kaspersky Lab first detailed Flame in late May 2012, it said that the malware had been used against Iran (in 189 attacks), Israel and Palestine (98), Sudan (32), Syria (30), Lebanon (18), Saudi Arabia (10) and Egypt (5). But it reported no attacks against French targets.
Another fact that makes the French allegations appear suspect is that in the online realm, accurately attributing attacks to a specific source is incredibly difficult, and any claims to the contrary are typically discounted unless backed by substantial, detailed evidence, produced by a reliable source. L’Express detailed no such evidence. Furthermore, while the command-and-control servers used in attacks may be traced back to a specific country — such as the United States — it’s easy to rent hosting space or use compromised PCs in that country to launch attacks, thus covering one’s tracks and complicating efforts to accurately ascertain attackers’ true location or location.
Political scientists argue Americans have all the information we need to make our voting decisions long before the campaign begins. So, we can—almost—call presidential elections while its still summertime. Why then do we have to endure long fall months of endless political rhetoric? Turns out, there is one simple reason.
Most of us who are interested in politics are relieved. Whether or not we liked the outcome of the election, we are simply happy not to have to read and hear endless news about the two campaigns anymore. But we probably could have tuned out altogether while it was still beach season—well before either of the nominating conventions.
We all know that most voters decide who to vote for well before the campaigns begin. In political science research, this is called the “minimal effects” thesis. Basically the vast majority of the voters vote how we would expect them to long before the election. The first study to investigate this phenomenon focused on voters during the 1940 election. Researchers found that only 8 percent of voters changed their preference over the course of the campaign. In 70 years, not much has changed.
As voters, we are not as foolish as political pundits seem to think we are. The parties are fairly clear and consistent about their positions on issues that the public cares about. While people decry the institutional problems caused by polarization, it does have some positive consequences for a voter’s ability to decipher which candidate/party is closer to their issue positions. So all voters need to do to pick a party (or candidate) is figure out what issue motivates them most (abortion, taxes) and which party is closest to their beliefs on that issue—once they’ve done that, they can stop paying attention and still vote as if they had been.
But about 33 percent of the public identifies as “independent.”
After spending months staring at the electoral map and trying to puzzle out which states might go for President Obama, which for Mitt Romney and by how much, we thought it was worth sorting through the actual results to find the 10 states where the two men ran closest.
These 10 states are likely to be the swing states of the future, the places where both parties — in presidential elections but also midterm races — target their time and money in hopes of swaying a relatively evenly divided electorate.
Before we get to the list of states, a few fun facts:
* Of the 10 states, Obama won nine of them. (North Carolina was the lone Romney victory.)
* Only one — Florida — appears likely to be decided by less than a single percentage point. (At the moment, Obama leads Romney by 0.6 percent with 99 percent of precincts reporting. That’s a change from 2008 when three states were decided by less than a point: Missouri (0.1 percent), North Carolina (0.4 percent) and Indiana (0.9 percent).
A group of people who have accurately predicted the winner of the popular vote in the last four presidential elections thinks President Barack Obama is headed for a second term: the American people.
Fifty-four percent of Americans think Obama will win the election, compared to 32 percent who predict a Romney victory, according to Gallup polling released Wednesday but conducted before Hurricane Sandy struck the East Coast. Eleven percent have no opinion.
Back in May, 56 percent believed an Obama win was likely in November, 36 percent thought Romney was likely to win, and 8 percent had no opinion, according to Gallup.
A Reuters/Ipsos poll released Tuesday found a similar result: 53 percent of registered voters believed Obama would win, compared to 29 percent for Romney.
Read more: politico.com
By latest count, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has logged 843,448 miles on the job: She is officially now the most traveled Secretary of State in U.S. history, 102 countries have seen her come and go. In one dispatch, it was breakfast in Vietnam, lunch in Laos, and dinner in Cambodia for our chief diplomat.
In the interim, campaign strategist David Axelrod has stayed close to home, Chicago and Washington, with one notable stop in Boston, where he sought to besmirch the gubernatorial record of Mitt Romney. But the foreign policy of Barack Obama is the foreign policy of David Axelrod. Gone is that hallowed past when the legendary George Marshall observed a strict separation between foreign policy and the political play at home: He had refused to cast a vote in presidential elections and he had bristled when the “political people” in President Truman’s circle of advisors intruded into the foreign policy domain.
We needn’t exalt the past—presidents always worried about the impact of foreign crises on their standing at home. Still, the subordination of foreign policy to the electoral needs of the Obama campaign stands apart in recent American history. Foreign policy has been masterfully neutralized in the Obamian world, taken off the board in this campaign.
Strategic Abdication in Afghanistan & Iraq
The meteoric rise of Barack Obama, the adoring crowds in Paris and Berlin, and the early dispatches from an Islamic world that looked upon him as a kindred spirit, concealed a political man with scant interest in foreign lands. Mr. Obama left the devotees to their own imagination; they read into him what they wished. He had come into office in the aftermath of an uncompromising American nationalist; he held aloft symbols of cosmopolitanism, and a supra-national elite took to him. But the animating drive of his foreign policy was his own quest for power.
During the first week of 2012, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Egypt’s effective ruling body, declared January 25 a national holiday marking the first anniversary of the beginning of the Glorious Revolution of the people (and the army). The revolution has succeeded, they proudly announced, and those who refuse to accept this are either foreign-employed agitators or disgruntled radicals. On January 22, Hosni Mubarak’s lead attorney wrapped up his defense in court by claiming that the deposed president was still Egypt’s legitimate ruler and by accusing the military not only of usurping power, but also of being implicated in the killing of more than 850 demonstrators during the first days of the revolt. That same day, the country’s first democratically elected Parliament was convening a few meters away from Tahrir Square, the heart and symbol of the revolt, with an overwhelming Islamist majority (70 percent of the vote, counting all Islamist factions) drunk with victory and dividing the spoils. On the January 25 holiday, hundreds of thousands (some say millions) of Egyptians marched all over the country in what was anything but a celebratory mood, chanting “Down with Military Rule!” and attacking Muslim Brothers in Tahrir. Yet when revolutionary activists called for a general strike on February 11 to reignite the struggle, only a few heeded their call. Finally, as the country prepared for presidential elections in May 2012, observers were astounded by the fact that two of those who announced their candidacy were none other than Mubarak’s vice president (the fearsome security chief Omar Suleiman) and his last prime minister (Ahmed Shafiq). And the runner-ups for the final round of elections, held in mid-June, were Shafiq, representing the old regime, and the Muslim Brothers’ candidate (and ultimate winner), Mohamed Morsi, representing an oppositional movement that has maintained an ambivalent attitude toward the revolution. If anything is certain at this point, it is that post-revolt politics are still quite fluid. Though a year and a half have gone by, the final verdict on the Egyptian Revolution—including whether it actually was one—is still to come.
ORGANIZATION, CLEARLY, is one of the main problems. As heroic as it was, the failure of the January 25 revolt to crystallize into a concrete revolutionary movement capable of harnessing popular energy, strategizing street battles, and negotiating on behalf of the mobilized people has minimized its political impact. Neither the temporary alliance of (secular and Islamist) vanguard activists who spearheaded the revolt nor the Muslim Brothers—the large opposition movement waiting in the wings to reap the gains—were up to the task of directing the uprising they helped unleash. And it was only natural for the average Egyptians who fueled the revolt to turn their backs on their seemingly clueless self-appointed leaders. Though the spirit of popular defiance has not yet dissipated, it is clear that the uprising fell short of its declared goal of overthrowing the regime.
History in Egypt: nearly a year and a half after the fall of the Mubarak regime, Muhammad Morsi has been announced the winner of Egypt’s presidential elections. The chairman of the Egyptian election committee, Farouk Sultan, announced that the Islamic candidate Morsi won with 52% (13,230,131) of the votes, defeating secular candidate Ahmad Shafiq, who took 48% (12,347,380 ), with the overall electoral turnout estimated at 51%.
Thousands of Morsi supporters gathered throughout the day at Cairo’s Tahrir Square ahead of the announcement by the Egyptian election committee, celebrating the candidate’s victory upon the announcement. A candidate running on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, Morsi’s presidential victory marks a comprehensive triumph for the Muslim Brotherhood.
Once outlawed under ousted Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the organization has risen in power since the popular uprising ended his rule, and previously won the majority of seats in Egypt’s February parliamentary elections..
Can’t say this is really surprising, though the results were closer than I would have expected. Any other secular candidate probably would have beat the Islamist Morsi by a wide difference, but Shafiq’s association with Mubarak (was his prime minister in the last days of the old regime) cost him too many votes.