Reposted from below, with some additional thoughts:

.@NicolasPelham Could #Hamas be offering #Israel the best interim agreement ever offered by an Arab administration? http://t.co/OPoYMZogic

— haaretz.com (@haaretzcom) July 28, 2014

It’s worth a read, even though I find it full of a whole lot of wishful thinking, especially in light of considering Hamas’ statements about long term aspirations. Gazans would certainly benefit from loosening the restrictions on movement, trade, and it would reduce the need to operate smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt (though it would likely persist to avoid tariffs imposed on transactions). A wealthier populace could be less tolerant of the use of force that would devastate what could be built if a true ceasefire were operative. It could have a moderating effect on the radicalization that Hamas uses to stay in power. But Hamas leaders aren’t interested in that.

What would Israel get out of this? Quiet along its most troublesome border, and it would let Israel devote more resources to other enterprises. However, it runs counter to current Israeli govt thinking about the strategic goals of Hamas and the need to contain that threat taking the group at its word.

Each time there’s a chance for a ceasefire, Hamas repeatedly refuses to take it, and Israel has resisted taking it. They’ve taken the easy way out - resuming fighting while civilians are in the cross-fire.

For Israel, the restraint is seen as weakness (both by the Israeli right and by Israel’s neighbors who see a refusal to go after Hamas as a sign Israel’s resolve to protect itself is waning and that they’re willing to absorb a regular barrage of attacks), and the Netenyahu government sees Hamas as an existential threat that must be contained or decimated. For Hamas, it sees not only a revolutionary struggle to build a Palestinian state, but one that eliminates Israel. Yet, Hamas forgoes the building part of the state - building civilian infrastructure and the necessary civilian apparatus that allows a society to flourish, and instead caters to the radicals and extremists (and itself is pushed to more extremism by groups that try to be even more extreme than Hamas already is - PRCs, al Qaeda-inspired groups, and rival Islamic Jihad). Instead, Hamas pours its efforts into building tunnels and bunkers from which to carry out attacks against Israel.

The tunnels are a symptom of the larger problems with Gaza and Hamas. Hamas prioritizes conflict with Israel over all else. The Hamas leadership has no problem with its minions wearing uniforms when it suits them, but in this conflict (as with 2012 and Cast Lead), those uniforms go missing the moment the attacks begin. It uses the situation to hide in and among civilians in Gaza who have no way/means to escape the cross-fire, and who live in fear for being called collaborators.

So, while the UN, EU, and others call for disarming Gaza and demilitarizing the area, not a single proposal has come forward offering up how to do so, let alone who would be involved in the effort.