re: #15 sator arepo tenet opera rotas

That much is obvious, yes (at least logically; both law and religion may disagree). Altho this is not the ground on which they argue for possibility of infanticide. They do go into the issue of what constitutes a person. BTW, the article is in an open access online.

I should have perhaps been a bit more clear. I was speaking in too general language when I should have been more specific (This is a fault I often exhibit).

I understand that their main grounds for claiming this would be moral is that the newborn in question does not yet qualify as a person and is, morally speaking, effectively identical to an unborn fetus. If you also take the view that a ‘potential person’, which has not yet become an ‘actual person’, should be treated differently for morality purposes and that termination of the ‘potential person’ is not immoral due to the interests of ‘actual people’ overriding their interests, then it makes sense to say that there is no moral difference between abortion any time prior to birth and abortion after birth.

As I said before, to me the biggest weakness, one which the paper only appears to touch on in a single paragraph at the end, is that you need to determine when the ‘potential person’ becomes an ‘actual person’ and I’m just not sure how you do this. The authors basically say “Not our problem to work out”, which doesn’t do much to help answer the question.