re: #303 Targetpractice

The historical record is that Truman was presented with three alternative proposals by his advisors.

The first was to send the Japanese a copy of the Trinity test film, to demonstrate the power and intensity of the new weapon that was developed. That was rejected on the grounds that the Japanese would simply dismiss the film as a hoax.

The second was to detonate one of the bombs on a small island off the mainland, giving the Japanese a live demonstration of the bomb’s power. That too was rejected, this time because the number of bombs then available was finite and the Japanese would probably be no more impressed than they would be with the film.

The final choice, the one that was chosen, was to drop one of the bombs on a target of strategic value, a nuclear version of the firebombings that had brought Japan to its knees. That was chosen, but the assumption was that a single bombing would be sufficient. The devastation and horror would be enough to shock the Japanese into accepting peaceful terms of surrender.

The reality is that, after Hiroshima, it was the Japanese leadership who refused to surrender and continued to lie to the people that the Emperor’s divine powers would protect them from further bombings. Nagasaki was the lesser of two evils, the greater evil being Operation Downfall, whose casualty estimates ranged in the millions of lives that would be lost.

I wouldn’t imply that Truman had no opportunity to call off the use of the bomb against a city but, as you indicate, the alternatives suggested were rejected. Given that some elements of the Japanese military would not accept the surrender even after two cities had been destroyed, the reasons for rejecting the alternatives appear sound.