re: #56 CuriousLurker

A few points for your consideration:
First, thank you for pointing out the oversight. We should have been more precise with respect to the facts and caught the error. And I applaud you for your effort to learn the facts for yourself. Nobody here, even those of us with deep knowledge of the subject, knows everything. Thank you, as well, for bringing the source to which you linked to my attention. I had not had an opportunity to read this material before and, although I have only been able today to read the summary on Mr. Mead’s blog and the Lozowick blog to which he links, I plan to read the underlying de-classified documents in the coming days.
Some additional items that you may wish to consider.
1. The discussions that were recently declassified are a limited snapshot of Israel’s leaders trying to decide what instructions they should give Israel’s ambassador to the UN in the immediate aftermath of the war.
2. The underlying documents, as Lozowick describes them, are a bit more nuanced re: the Gaza Strip. They reveal: (i) Israeli decision makers discussed the issue (as well as the West Bank and Golan Heights) in the context of its status under international law, namely that since it had not been part of Egypt’s sovereign territory and its statuts was legally that of disputed territory, Israel had the greater right to it, under international law, by virtue of their possession of the space, until its status was resolved (oddly, in the immediate aftermath of the war, they were more dispassionate on the subject than most people who “discuss” it today); and (ii) while there were those in the room who wanted to annex the Gaza Strip, they did not decide one way or another what to do with it, including whether they would “return” it to Egypt, in the context of a peace deal.
3. With respect to the portion of Jerusalem that Israel captured, you are absolutely correct that at that moment there was unanimity among the people whose discussions were recently declassified that no part of Jerusalem would be returned to Jordan. There also was almost certainly near unanimity on that point among Israel’s Jewish population at the time. Bear two points in mind with respect to the context, though: (1) Israel had just captured the balance of Jerusalem after being attacked by Jordan, despite their pleas to King Hussein to stay out of what until then was only a war with Egypt and Syria; and (ii) Israel’s population had, only days before, been digging graves in their parks for the expected casualties in the war of annihilation which their Arab neighbors had promised. As you well know, over the ensuing years, the position of Israel’s leaders and of its population have ceased to be unanimous on point.
4. I take you at your word that you are “fully aware of the violent conditions that brought about the Six-Day War”. However, your use of the phrase “the apparent existential threat posed to Israel by the Arab armies sourrounding it” is somewhat vague. If you mean that it is unclear that was the desire or intent of Israel’s Arab neighbors, your statement is factually incorrect, and there is an extensive historical record on that point. If, on the other hand, you mean that it is questionable whether the Arabs could actually have achieved their stated intention, you are absolutely correct, although, as noted, the fear that they might achieve that result was certainly widespread not only in Israel but around the world.
5. Similarly, with respect to your description of the famous “Three No’s” as an “attitude” among the Arabs, I am sure you know that “no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel” was formailzed as policy among the Arab states at their Khartoum conference only weeks later. You are, however, correct, that the policy represented the widespread attitude in the Arab world (and, for many, it unfortunately still is)