Friendship Won’t Fix Washington - the Atlantic
With the Republican takeover in the Senate in 1980 for the first time in 26 years, and then with the Gingrich-driven GOP takeover in the House in 1994 for the first time in 40 years, we saw a sea change in politics that amplified the impact of the permanent campaign. From then on, every election has had within it the seeds of a turnover in party control in one chamber or the other, or both. The stakes became much higher—and were made higher yet by the increasing ideological polarization of the parties in both houses. Suddenly, working with those on the other side of the aisle had potentially larger consequences—it might make voters feel better about the other party, and might reward them for popular policies or just for working together.
Now add in two more powerful disincentives to working together for the common good. What drove the huge GOP victory in 1994? The broad sense that Washington wasn’t working—driven by the Gingrich-led Republican unity against any significant initiative from President Clinton. This dragged down approval of both parties in Washington, but for a public that believes presidents drive action and should just make things happen, it worked especially well against the president’s party. A strategy of gridlock, of thwarting ballyhooed White House signing ceremonies while working hard to demonize the president, brought benefits. The same approach, doubled down in 2009-2010 with the twist of delegitimizing any policies enacted by one party, worked even better in the 2010 midterms.