re: #12 zombie

You are a zombie. You have zombie ideas.

David Chalmers has written about the philosophical conceivability of zombies, and the implications of this for philosophy of mind. His conclusions are full of shit, but the analysis is interesting all the same. The question is what role our emotions, our subjectivity, matters. What if there were zombies who REASONED exactly as we do, but more like a computer does, without feelings? They would be indistinguishable from the outside, he says. What then of our-selves?

So, when I would talk of zombie ideas, I would talk about handling issues rationally, on their own terms, without preconditions. Res ispa loquitur, basically - the thing speaks for itself. Exactly where Chalmers is wrong, is where he imagines that the selfhood is not included in that reasoning, in that rationality. Which is why, in the end, there are no such things as zombies, really, there are just people, agents, with stories and interests, and rational to whatever degree.

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Of course this entirely begs the question of what you should call your school of thought, but perhaps it will nudge you in one direction or another.