Calculating an End to Divisive Politics - Miller-McCune
Much scholarly research never suggests a clear practical application for the public good. You can’t say that about the work of Steven J. Brams, professor of politics at New York University. He seems to have an angle on everything.
True to form, he has advice that could help detoxify national politics and pull the agenda from the grip of political extremists … and a better way to elect candidates in a political primary where there seems to be no clearly superior choice … and how to pick a special congressional committee when important work needs to be done on divisive issues.
Born in Concord, N.H., and educated at MIT and Northwestern, Brams, at 71, is the kind of measured, unflashy communicator — he has a slight New England accent — you would expect to teach a math class.
Yet he is a formidable representative of the “rational choice” or “social choice” professoriate — scholars who apply economic methods to problems once reserved for other disciplines. Some consider rational choice adherents an invasive species, and Brams does seem to represent the “go anywhere” approach.
The Public Choice Society — Brams was its president from 2004 to 2006 — says its members still use economic methods but combine them with others “that are not clearly identified with any self-contained discipline.”
Brams, for example, has devoted his career to the application of mathematics and game theory to elections, politics, property, international disputes, and law. He is an owner or partner in three patents related to his ideas, and he has also delved into literature and pro football.
Many of his ideas share a common outcome — no one gets everything they want, but most people get a good share of what they want. So if you’re filled with fiery rhetoric and aim for total victory, Brams may not be your guy.
In his 2008 book Mathematics and Democracy, Brams shows how we can use math to parse all the alternatives and outcomes possible in different voting systems “to illuminate how, in a democracy, individual preferences are aggregated to produce outcomes sought by the electorate.”
Another important part of his work involves the study of decisions and outcomes involving multiple parties — the definition of game theory. He uses it to show how public and private goods can be fairly divided in disputes, according to due process and rule of law.