re: #39 EPR-radar

So, even if the most favorable assumptions are made (such as no intervention by China), this scenario envisions near-total warfare against North Vietnam, pretty much to the unconditional surrender level in order to end to support of insurgents in the South by the North.

After that, 10+ years of nation building in adverse circumstances.

One has to be a most dedicated cold warrior indeed for that to look like a reasonable use of US power.

No, sir. A limited amphibious assault north of the DMZ would have been used to eliminate NVA artillery positions and troop concentrations. The NVA forces in that region did not have to elaborate concealment and defense positions that force inside South Vietnam had; Caught in the open, they would have been smashed by superior American firepower. This would also have put us in position to use ground raids to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Logistics routes are very vulnerable to group attacks unless heavily guarded, which is why the Vietnamese communists used convoy ambush as a tactic against the French (with great success) and against the US (with initial success, but thereafter largely in failure due to US adaptations). Employing the tactic against them would have either choked off their units in the South or force the NVA to fight more mobile engagements along the Trail, engagements it was not well suited for.

Couple that sort of tactic with the mining of Haiphong, and the resultant logistical damage would likely have forced the North to back off. Surrender would neither be needed nor sought, nor would attacks on the major population centers of the North be made, save in limited fashion directed at legitimate military targets. There would be no bloodbath.