The “Greater” Middle East: The New Geopolitical Environment and Its Implications for Obama Administration Policies
By Hillel Fradkin

The most recent developments show that during the next four years, two countries, Iran and Pakistan, will require the overwhelming majority of attention from U.S. policymakers. President-elect Obama has announced that he will prioritize the prosecution and successful conclusion of our military actions in Afghanistan and the prevention of terrorist attacks, and he has rightly observed the key to these ambitions appears to lie in part, if not in whole, across the border in Pakistan, where both the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda enjoy safe haven. Achieving these goals requires the active cooperation of the Pakistani government.

In the case of Pakistan, the central goal of our policy is very clear, almost startlingly so: the survival of the present government and the continuation of its present course. This offers the best hope of achieving the president-elect’s objectives in Afghanistan. It also offers the best hope of avoiding the radicalization of the Pakistani government and its policies or the chaotic breakup of the country—or both.

The U.S. must also give priority to the prevention of a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. Currently, the U.S. is regarded by both as the best, and practically speaking, the only, available broker of peace.

In the case of Iran, our most immediate objective is preventing it from acquiring nuclear weapons, which would create new dynamics, such as a regional nuclear arms race, for which there is no precedent and no established policy instruments.

Since the summer of 2003, we have mainly pursued this objective through negotiations led by our European allies, and alternatively with a sanctions regime. Unfortunately, this approach has failed to yield any results.
The president-elect has also announced his intentions to give negotiations with Iran another chance on an “unconditional” basis. An initiative yet to be defined is certain to be taken. Iran, however, has already declared that our main objective— the end or suspension of its nuclear program—is not open for discussion.

The central remaining option is military action. The U.S. is unlikely to take this course. It is possible that Israel, which now regards Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat, might take action. But Israel will also operate under many restraints which reduce, if they do not eliminate, this possibility. It’s likely Iran will possess a nuclear weapon, and perhaps several, by the end of 2009. In this case, the new administration will have to proceed on a two-fold basis: negotiations that aim to restrain Iran, and, ultimately, preparations for the likelihood that effort will fail.